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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
VICTOR RIOS, Case No. 20090862 
Defendant/Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Burglary, a 1st 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2009); Aggravated Assault, a 
3rd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2009), in the Second 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, Judge, 
presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I: Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for aggravated 
burglary where Rios was alleged to have entered or remained unlawfully in the motel 
room. 
8 
Issue II: Whether this Court should define the "remains unlawfully" provision of Utah's 
burglary statute to require surreptitiousness. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict, this Court 
reviews "the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Hubba, 
2002 UT App 175,5 2,51 P.3d 21 (citation omitted). This Court "will reverse the 
conviction only when the evidence . . . i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained fr reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 
883, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
These issues were not preserved by counsel, who failed to make an objection or 
file appropriate motions. It is Mr. Rios's contention that fyis counsel was ineffective for 
failing to do so and that this Court may still review the matters under a plain error 
standard. See State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,5 12, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Counsel also did not preserve the issue on the statutory construction of the 
burglary statute. This court reviews issues of statutory construction for correctness, 
according no deference to the legal conclusions of other (pourts. State v. Martinez, 2002 
UT 80, J 5,52 P.3d 1276. Defendant contends that this cpurt may still construe the 
statute, as a matter of law, despite counsel's failure to preserve this issue under a plain 
error analysis. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 12, 10 P.3d 346. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2009); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-203 (2009); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (2009); Utah R. Crim. P. 12,23 and 24. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated March 17,2009, the State charged Victor Rios 
("Appellant," "Victor," "Rios") with Aggravated Burglary, a 1stdegree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2009); and Aggravated Assault, a 3rd degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2009). 
On August 26-27,2009, both counts were tried before a jury, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, Judge, 
presiding. The jury convicted Mr. Rios of both counts. Mr. Rios filed a timely notice of 
appeal on October 15,2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 16,2009, at 1:13 a.m. in Ogden City, Officer Steve Zaccardi was 
dispatched to a domestic disturbance at the Courtyard Hotel. (R. 130:13-15, 19,45.) The 
caller described hearing a struggle and a woman calling out for help. (R. 130:16.) About a 
minute or two later, as the officer approached the scene, he observed a male running 
toward a bar. (R. 130:45; 17; 18.) The male looked unsure of himself, stopping, looking 
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underneath a car and looking down an alley. (R. 130:18.) Nonetheless, the officer 
continued on to the call, never getting this person's information. (R. 130:18; 49.) 
When he arrived at the Courtyard Hotel—what the officer described as a cheap 
hotel in a high crime neighborhood—this individual apprpached the officer, asking him if 
had heard the pop. (R. 130:19; 51.) The officer replied thit he had not and the man 
mentioned that "there was a woman down here screaming for help", gesturing toward the 
bar. (R. 130:21.) Officer Zaccardi called for backup, at which point the man ran off. (R. 
130:21.) 
The officer went to room 253, his dispatch location, where he found Joy VanDyke, 
on her bed yelling, apparently at 911. (R. 130:21; 22,10,|14-15.) Ms. VanDyke indicated 
she had been attacked by a male. (R. 130:22.) The office^ testified she was "very upset" 
and "very distraught", though she appeared to be "very certain of her statements ..." (R. 
130:42.) 
Ms. VanDyke testified that she had been staying at the Courtyard Hotel for around 
ten days. (R. 130:58.) On March 16,2009 at around 1 an}, she heard repeated knocks on 
the door, but didn't answer because of the lateness of the hour. (R. 130:59.) The person 
kept knocking and so she opened the door, not bothering to look through the peephole, 
even though she did not know anyone who would come by her room that late. (R. 130:75, 
76.) A man asked her if she had a joint. (R. 130:22; 59.) She testified that she laughed 
and stated, "No, I don't have any joints. Only cigarettes.'^ (R. 130:60.) She testified that 
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the individual who knocked on the door was Mr. Rios. (R. 130:60.) Ms. VanDyke 
testified that she offered the man a cigarette, at which point her dog "was trying to attack 
him." (R. 130:60; 61.) She turned to grab a pack of cigarettes off a chest of drawers, 
dragging her dog, and when she turned back, the defendant had entered the motel room. 
(R. 130:61; 77.) 
Ms. VanDyke then approached the man to give him the cigarettes and told him to 
leave the room. (R. 130:61.) She testified that the man "proceeded to move toward" her. 
(R. 130:63.) Her specific testimony was that "he came into my room as my back was 
turned ... behind me; and I turned around and he had $2 that he was giving me. I says, 
'No, I don't want it. Just go.'" (R. 130:79; 63; 69.) She stated, "Here's the cigarettes" and 
he "got in his pocket and he gave me $2.1 said, i don't want the money. Just keep the 
money. Just get out.'" (R. 130:63.) He "meandered toward the door," she testified. (R. 
130:63.) "I kept saying, 'Go. Get out. Get out. Go," she testified. (R. 130:63.) Ms. 
VanDyke testified that she never asked him to enter her room, nor did she give him 
permission to stay. (R. 130:73.) 
When the man was standing in the door casing, he turned around "like he was 
having second thoughts" (R. 130:79) and Ms. VanDyke "shoved him to try and get him 
out so I could slam the door." (R. 130:63.) At this point, she testified that the man hit her 
in the forehead. (R. 130:63.) Prior to this point, Ms. VanDyke testified that there had 
been no violence. (R. 130:79.) 
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"
 u c nd started choking her, (R. 130:63, 22.) He tried to put his hand ovci her 
' vet she testified that she attempted to fight with hi|m and yelled for help. (R. 
(i:54^ ^ t bit his hand, at winch point lie straddled hei and pul hr. hands .ii tuiul Ii i 
l
- * ithe and that she attempted to 
pry his fingers off her throat. (R. 130:65.) She indicated tfiat when ^he won]*', 'kick him 
in the groin", he would "reach down and try and undo his| pants * ;0:or vie 
testified thai as she began U» black >il, ill < I i " ih Mi u In (iM J •. • , 
walked mil f l i r i lnni and It' l l "' 11/ I UV66-67.) 
Ms. \....... IVJ gave a d^..^..| ^ . . - -
dli iV! ^ ' .vcn <mu wiiu was wean»n? l< vl ud 
L and blue jeans.
 VR. 130:07.) She aK* testified she had no recollection o\ an\ \: • 
coming off her attacker's shirt (R 130:68.) 
Off icer Zaccardi indicated the room appeared cluttered and that Ms. VanDyke told 
him. the mess occurred because of the struggle (R 1343:23.) I hough 1\ Is. S ai il)> ke 
les l | t "M »i».a Mi. !»'"< - " i Il i, iiiii^ ,iiii Hiiiiiiiill bet ijiisc slii haul mil r n r n l l s inn nil lliu in I Ih! 
130:58.; Oliiwer Zaccardi indicated that police were able to locate and phc._,_ 
one dollar bills 1 M- v,,nDyke's room, which she clairried were given to her by N Ir 
Rios >s . * - . iiiigcrpiints wcne lound on llu lull1. 11< I HI \H,\ t Itdim ns jul « 
locai ei i; i j n t« ,k ; i g c «; )i i ;igai cl 1 es ( )ii 1 1:ii ! I: >e< 1, which appareiitly were the ones Ms. VanDyke 
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gave to Mr. Rios. (R. 130:40-41) (Officer Zaccardi indicated that Ms. VanDyke stated 
"this is the pack of cigarettes that I . . . gave him. He asked for cigarettes and I gave him 
the whole pack.") The officer admitted that although the surface of the cigarette pack 
could have been dusted for prints, that work was not done. (R. 130:54-55.) 
The officer noticed two multi-colored cream buttons on the floor of the motel 
room. (R. 130:24; 25.) One of the buttons still had thread on it. (R. 130:25.) The officer 
had to lift a bed in order to see one of the buttons underneath it. (R. 130:26-27; 29.) 
According to Officer Zaccardi, Ms. VanDyke had a bruise on her forehead, red 
marks on her neck, scratches on her arms, a cut on her hand and scrapes on her elbows, 
though photographs were only shown of marks on her elbows, leg, knee, fingers and 
neck. (R. 130:30; 32; 33.) The officer's opinion was that the marks were consistent with 
someone grabbing the neck (R. 130:30) and Ms. VanDyke testified these marks were 
from the injuries she sustained that night and not from prior injuries. (R. 130:72.) 
At this point, Officer Michah Stephens arrived at the Courtyard Inn. (R. 130:90.) 
Walking up the north stairwell, he encountered the defendant who was wearing a plaid 
shirt and blue jeans. (R. 130:90.) The officer asked Mr. Rios what he was doing and he 
responded that "he was there drinking with a friend." (R. 130:92.) Mr. Rios did not tell 
the officer which room he had been at. Id. The defendant stated that he was sorry and that 
it was his fault. Id. When asked specifically what he meant by that, Mr. Rios stated that 
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Ofliopi 'aa/aidi ujs 11111I ill, i l Hhm Stephens II;111 slopped iin individual who 
matched a description givui bj Mb. \ anU>ke.
 Kli. i J U . J J ; 94-95.) The officer had 1\ Is 
VanDyke step ou\ * *f \W . -. •• • T J - ' Officer Zaccardi shoWn his light on Mr. Rios, who 
was standing apprc)\4:i,aici> iv\L„i. , . i (In silan n i II hi 
I ill" iJ »>S i WIn"iii asked il slir \\)\\U\ id- : * iimi, Ms. \fanDyke indicated she was 100 
percent sure police had the right individual, (R . 130:34.) 
The oliiuTs photographed 'Ufiot,, ni|iirii s on Mi - Rios, including scratches on his 
neck, arms, and elbow. (R. 130:36.) They also took Mr. Rios's shirt into evidence, noting 
that several buttons appeared to have been n ppi w . -i. - - ^ ^ • i 
At trial, an individual named Ric^ Gurule testified. He worked as a security guard 
at the El Mirador Bar. (R 130:8" x Me testified that at around 1:30 am. a. i ..u to escort 
Mi Rios oul ".| flu; liai jinl h> ] \h , I-ti «;'-, h mv at loss1 flic stra.1 11«!" 1 ^ *7 «K; ^ i 1" vli 
Gurule's testimony was that when he escorted Mr. Rios Qut of the bar, Mr. Rios was 
wearing khakis and a "bluish" colored shirt, buttoned to tfhe top. (R 130:85,) When 
shown state' s exhtbil J"i). Mi I diode iitidiealed dial lliu1* slinl appealed "i iiiiiiii »nM III1 i 
if a as "sitntiiiiii I n " Hi* oiis M r K i n s v\ as w e a r i n g t h a t e v e n i n g -K. i 3 0 : 8 5 . ) M i .Gurule 
testified that Mr. Rios's shirt appeared to be in good condition that evening, with the shirt 
buttoned up to the top. (R. 130:86.) Mr. Gurule did not see any injuries on Mr. Rios. (R. 
130:86.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Rios contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to convict him of 
the burglary count because it presented no evidence at the trial, which would support a 
conclusion that Mr. Rios formed the intent to commit the burglary either before entering 
Ms. VanDyke's apartment or after he remained unlawfully on the apartment. The 
evidence could rationally support a contention that Mr. Rios unlawfully remained on Ms. 
VanDyke's property, but not that he ever formed an intent to commit any sort of criminal 
offense prior to this unlawful remainder. At best, the evidence supports a conclusion that 
Mr. Rios formed his intent to assault Ms. VanDyke the moment she pushed him, trying to 
get him to leave her apartment. This error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
which had a duty to dismiss this count. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 17, 10 P.3d 
346. 
Second, Mr. Rios contends that the burglary statute requires an element of 
surreptitiousness if the defendant is charged with remaining unlawfully on the premises. 
Burglary at common, and in modern, law requires that defendants engage in some sort of 
surreptitious behavior in order to "unlawfully remain" on the premises. Otherwise, 
persons could be convicted of burglary who commit crimes after they have been asked to 
leave. For example, a repairman who subsequently strikes a homeowner could be charged 
16 
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It jLijuiiige, citing difficulties in reconciling it with the common law of burglary. Model 
Penal Code § 2?1 1 m t ^ -r ^n ^IUK.« imnv , -.» .. aFiers r e c o m m e n d s , . ^ 
adopt t • 
situation • mcji a person '"surreptitiously' remained \yithout license or privilege." Id. 
cmt. 3(a) at 67 71 Mr. Rios contends that this court must read surreptitiousness into the 
"remains unlawfully pun -* tliu sUuuic \o avoid l n^u i^ r - . . ; ~ 
P ' • % " - ! )\ ke's home, but on her pr^r* , rt\ 
even if he were asked lo ^ ~ v , lie i \uua-onl \ ht / IMJ . ' I ^ I with aggravated assauii t-ui not 
aggravated burglary. The justifications for making this alburglary, simply because the 
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ARGUMENT 
L MR, RIOS'S BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
THE STATE FAILED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT MR, 
RIPS ENTERED OR REMAINED IN A DWELLING WITH AN INTENT TO 
COMMIT A FELONY, THEFT OR ASSAULT, 
Mr. Rios contends that the State did not present evidence showing that he entered 
or remained on the victim's property with the intent to commit a crime, and as such failed 
to meet the elements of burglary. He also contends that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to preserve this issue and that this Court should find that the trial court committed 
plain error by failing to dismiss the burglary charge. 
A. Mr. Rios's Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Move to Dismiss the 
Aggravated Burglary Count, but this Court may Review this Issue for 
Plain Error, 
Mr. Rios contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him of 
the burglary count. Because Mr. Rios's counsel did not raise this issue at the trial court, 
Mr. Rios has the burden of demonstrating "the trial court committed plain error by 
submitting the case to the jury." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,5 12,55 P.3d 1131. 
This Court must examine the record to determine whether "after viewing the evidence 
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes for 
18 
'iinliinii ,ind intmuil quotation omitted). 
~ « v liicii ve undertake an s:\iiiMihdum of the ••- H*M v determine 'whether the 
evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental iluit it was plain error to submit Ihe 
case ;). 
In other words, the defendant has a. burden to "demonstrate first that the e\ idence 
was insufficicnl In suppnil a MIIIMI linn ml tin i iiiiiiiiiii i !iai|jnl Sttih i Uoli;!!!!* • <MMI 11 I 
7 : 1 f 1 1 1< I1 " kl 146 Sec :<: )iid, the uciciidant must show "that the insufficiency was so 
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury " Id. 
The Marshaled Evidence Does Not Support a Finding that Mr, Rios 
Entered or Remained in a Dwelling with thcf Intent to Commit a Felony, 
Theft, or Assault, 
"When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of a jury's verdict, he must marshal 
the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidei ice is 
2009 UT App 369,5 33,645 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal citation and quotation omitted) 
li le 
crime." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 J 25, !() P.3d 346 .(According to the Code, a person 
commits burglary if "he enters or remains unlawful!) . a <; i iuhuing or any portion of a 
binMiny will In mi in ill i iiil I i i IIIIIIIIIII I I ,1 Hi I in , ( h i ill mi1 II I mi,, in i i a i I 
Utah Code An- • Ho-o-^v^ • • Joo*- . - • vl s - becomes a™ravated if Mr. Rios 
"cause[d] bodily injury to another in the course of the burglary." State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, J[ 25,10 P.3d 346 referring to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203. 
Defendant's contention is that the state presented sufficient evidence to show that 
Mr. Rios remained unlawfully in the building and that there was sufficient evidence to 
show that he caused bodily injury to Ms. VanDyke. Ms. VanDyke testified that after she 
picked up the cigarettes, Mr. Rios handed her $2 and "meandered" toward the door. (R. 
130:63.) She repeatedly asked him to leave. Id. At the door casing, he turned around, and 
Ms. VanDyke shoved him "to try and get him out." Id. This act alone is probably 
sufficient basis for a jury to find that Mr. Rios "remained" unlawfully. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1). Additionally, Ms. VanDyke's testimony was replete with 
allegations of assault—including him choking her until she nearly blacked out. (R. 
130:63-67.) The state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find the "aggravated" 
element of burglary in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203. 
Yet, no evidence was presented from which a jury could infer that Mr. Rios had 
the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault when he entered or remained on the 
premises. At the trial, the State presented the following evidence regarding Mr. Rios's 
intent to commit a burglary. This evidence will be presented in a light most favorable to 
the State. 
1. Mr. Rios continued to knock on Ms. VanDyke's door at around 1 am. (R. 
130:59-60.) 
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^. , ^ . \ aiiD}kc laughed and said that she did not have a joint, but had 
cigarettes. flR llfKfM 
I l""JV \ i l l l l ) \ k l " U C l l i I. f.Vl Mil1 . I ^ t l t l l C . ,,,.! K I ' i11! !CI( UV J f M f l i l H '»! 
while her back was turned. (R. 130:61; 77.) 
^. _ _ '- :.Moceeded to move towards her, pulling two dollars out of his 
~—Vt '
 (X . • i 
jii Jlii i' ' t ant th 3 monej ;r and asked him to 
leave. (R. 130:79; 63; 69.) She either said, fJust go" (R. 130:79) or "Just 
j!eliM!!M T ^0:63.) 
> ; ,i, , ;11il )\ kv repcatedh iiskcd 
him t * < ci out. Gel out. (Jo. \>- i^.v^.j 
8, Mr. Rios turned around in Hie dom casing and Ms. VanDyke shoved him to 
try to get him out so she could siu... ,;, 
I
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around her throat. (R. 130:65.) 
12 MN \".niD\ke kicked him 'a ihe groin and Mr. Rios reached down and tried 
to undo his |,u..i, 
13. As Ms. VanDyke began to black out, Mr. Rios got up off of her, walked out 
the door and left. (R. 130:66-67.) 
14. When Mr. Rios was apprehended, he stated to officers that he was sorry 
and that it was his fault. (R. 130:92.) 
15.The officers asked Mr. Rios what he meant by that and he replied that he 
had been drinking. (R. 130:92-93.) 
The first fundamental problem in the verdict surrounded the intent element. 
[I]ntent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, and intent is rarely established by direct evidence. We therefore 
must look to the circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom to determine whether '"the evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust. 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5J 26, 10 P.3d 346 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
The state does not have direct evidence of Mr. Rios's intent, so the key question is 
whether the circumstantial evidence justifies a conclusion that Mr. Rios entered the hotel 
with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault. 
Assault/Sexual Assault. The state could argue that Mr. Rios remained in Ms. 
VanDyke's apartment in order to commit some sort of assault, but this is extremely 
difficult to extrapolate from the evidence. First, at no point did Ms. VanDyke tell him that 
he could not come into her apartment. She indicated that she would get him some 
cigarettes and she turned her back to get them. (R. 130:61; 77.) He entered her property at 
this point and produced two dollars, which is highly consistent with an intent to pay her 
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for the cigarettes. At this point, Ms. VanDyke asked him to leave and he "meandered" 
toward the door. (R. 130:63.) When Mr. Rios turned arouhd in the door casing, a 
reasonable inference the jury could have made was that he remained in the premises 
without Ms. VanDyke's permission. 
Yet this is a crucial moment: nothing about Mr. Rips's behavior indicated that 
when he remained in the door casing, that he had the intent to commit some sort of 
assault. He had not been violent or threatening previously. No statements were made to 
this effect. He never touched Ms. VanDyke. He was not Aggressive. Only when Ms. 
VanDyke shoved him did Mr. Rios engage in the assault, 
A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that M t Rios manifested the intent to 
commit an assault, but the key is that the intent only manifested itself after Ms. VanDyke 
admitted to shoving Mr. Rios. There simply are no piece$ of evidence or no reasonable 
inferences from that evidence which would justify that Mr. Rios had the intent to commit 
the assault before he unlawfully remained on the premises. He asked her about a joint and 
they talked about cigarettes. He remained in her door casing when she asked him to 
leave. Nothing else was discussed and no other evidence was presented—no reasonable 
inferences can be made from those facts which would indicate that Mr. Rios had the 
intent to commit an assault. Again, the key is that prior to Ms. VanDyke's shove, no 
evidence was presented to indicate an intent to commit an assault. 
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On the contrary, the evidence supports the inference that Mr. Rios manifested the 
intent to commit the assault as soon as he was shoved by Ms. VanDyke. As soon as she 
shoved him, Mr. Rios became extremely violent. Yet this behavior was precipitated by 
the shove and probably by Mr. Rios's level of intoxication. 
Theft. There is no question that Mr. Rios lacked the intent to commit a theft 
because Ms. VanDyke indicated that Mr. Rios paid her two dollars for the cigarettes. (R. 
130:61; 63; 69; 79.) Nothing was stolen from the room before, during or after the crime. 
No implication was ever made that the defendant possessed this intent. Finally, and 
perhaps significantly, Mr. Rios stood up abruptly and left—he didn't take anything, 
which he certainly could have if he intended to commit a theft. Even if we assume that 
Mr. Rios entered Ms. VanDyke's apartment (or remained unlawfully), the law still 
requires additional proof. "The mere unlawful entry into private premises may not alone 
support a finding of intent [to commit theft|." State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 
1986). The state must present more evidence than a mere unlawful entry or remainder. 
Felony. Looking at the state's marshaled evidence, it is difficult to find a felony 
that Mr. Rios intended to commit. Mr. Rios did ask Ms. VanDyke if she had a joint, 
which is certainly criminal behavior. But the problem with a burglary charge is that the 
state would have to show that Mr. Rios entered or remained on Ms. VanDyke's property 
in order to commit that crime. There is no evidence of that. When Ms. VanDyke denied 
having the marijuana, the subject changed quickly to cigarettes, which Ms. VanDyke 
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went to get, for which Mr. Rios paid her. The key is whether Mr. Rios entered or 
remained on the property for the intent to get drugs. He never pursued that subject with 
her further and no evidence was presented showing that Mr. Rios intended to complete a 
drug deal. When Mr. Rios abruptly got up and left, he did not search through her house in 
an attempt to find drugs. 
The State clearly showed that Mr. Rios remained unlawfully in Ms. VanDyke's 
room, but there was no evidence presented from which a reasonable jury could infer that 
he had the intent to commit one of the required offenses when he remained on the 
property. In fact, evidence to support this element was "completely lacking." State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 26,10 P.3d 346. 
Appellate courts have found insufficient evidence in burglary cases for even 
stronger cases than this one. In Walls v. State, 299 S.W.2(i 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957), 
the court found insufficient evidence for a burglary wher0 the defendant walked into a 
grocery store with pants open and his privates exposed, saw the complainant and her 
friend, said, "Oh" and then left the store. Id. at 953 (reasoning that insufficient evidence 
was presented that the defendant intended to commit a sexual assault). 
The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for burglary where the evidence 
showed that the defendant stabbed another person in his l|iome. Warrick v. United States, 
528 A.2d 438 (D.C. App. 1987). In that case, the defendant entered a home while most of 
the family was asleep. Id. at 440. The victim arrived home and the defendant came to his 
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back, said "Stick up" and stabbed him in the neck. Id. The victim and defendant struggled 
as several family members also woke up and participated in the fight. Id. During the 
struggle, the defendant repeatedly said, "Sharon let me in" and fled. Id. After the 
struggle, the family noticed their T.V. sitting in a carrying bag on the living room floor, 
having been moved from its location on a stand. Id. at 441. 
The D.C. Court cited some authority for determining intent: 
Unauthorized presence in another^ premises does not alone support an inference 
of criminal purpose at the time of entry, but when the unauthorized presence is 
aided by other circumstances, such an inference may be drawn. We have never 
attempted to narrowly define the kind of "other circumstances" which might 
support an inference of criminal intent, preferring to consider in each case whether 
the circumstances are such as might lead reasonable people, based upon their 
common experience, to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 
intended to commit some crime upon the premises. 
Id. at 442 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The court found insufficient evidence for a burglary, noting the assault and the 
potential theft. 
The fact that Warrick committed an assault once inside the premises does not 
justify an inference that he intended to do so when he entered the home. Cf. Parker 
v. United States, 449 A.2d 1076, 1077 (D.C. 1982) (the sole fact that person who 
entered premises on legitimate business stole property once inside "very likely" 
would not support inference of intent to commit crime at time of entry). As to his 
placement of a T.V. set in a bag, although this evidence may support an inference 
of an intent to steal, it is not indicative of an intent to commit assault. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court also considered the dangerous weapon. 
We are left with the fact that at the time he entered the Malone home, Warrick was 
armed with a dangerous weapon. This evidence might support an inference that he 
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intended to use the weapon if somebody attempted to interfere with his taking of 
property. A conviction for burglary may not rest on such an "//". 
Were we to hold that intent to commit assault may be inferred from possession of 
a dangerous weapon, such an inference could be made in every case in which a 
defendant was charged with burglary while armed1 substantially relieving the 
government of the burden of proving intent in sucfy cases. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Like Warrick, the Mr. Rios contends that the state presented no evidence showing 
that he possessed the intent to commit any sort of offensei either when he entered her 
property or when he remained unlawfully on her property]. And like Warrick, this court 
should find that the mere fact that a person committed an assault while on the premises 
does not justify a finding that the intent was present prioi to the assault. 
Other courts have agreed with this contention that mere commission of a crime on 
the premises is insufficient to sustain a burglary conviction. "We feel that the fact that the 
accused commits a crime within the structure entered is, without more, insufficient to 
prove his intent to commit a crime at the time of entry." Commonwealth v. Crowson, 405 
A.2d 1295,1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (citing State v. Johnson, 466 P.2d 29,30 (Ariz. 
App. 1970); State v. Keys, 419 P.2d 943,947 (Or. 1966). 
In one case, the defendant entered a property, and while the victim told him to 
leave or she would call the police, he attempted to enter through the front door, back door 
and window. Rodriguez v. Florida, 460 So.2d 514 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984). The court found 
insufficient evidence on an attempted burglary because the state failed to show the 
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defendant had the intent to commit an offense in her home. Id. at 514. That court felt the 
facts better supported the elements of trespass. Id. 
Mr. Rios would contend his case is similar to the Rodriguez case in that the 
elements better fit a trespass conviction over those of a burglary, simply because of the 
missing intent in his case. The state certainly presented evidence that Mr. Rios remained, 
albeit slightly, beyond Ms. VanDyke's permission, which would amount to a trespass, but 
not a burglary. See also B.D. v. Florida, 412 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding 
insufficient evidence for a burglary conviction but sufficient evidence for a trespass 
conviction). 
In another case, the defendant was observed by store security in a K-Mart putting 
a bag in his cart. Illinois v. O'Banion, 625 N.E.2d 451 (111. Ct. App. 1993). Security 
watched him put three video games in the bag, one in his coat pocket and walk toward the 
front of the store. Id. at 451-52. The defendant left the store with the items and without 
paying for them. Id. at 452. The court found insufficient evidence for a burglary because 
the state presented no evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft when he 
entered the store. Id. There had to be circumstances, the court said, which supported the 
felonious intent upon entry. Id. 
One court found insufficient evidence for a burglary where the defendant cut the 
screen on the back door and fled when noticed by the home's occupants. Ramon v. Texas, 
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657 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App. 1983) (declining to find suffipient evidence for burglary with 
intent to commit rape or trespass). 
The Florida District Court of Appeal found insuffipient evidence to convict on a 
burglary where the defendant entered a home without permission and had a huge beer and 
marijuana party. P.D.T. v. Florida, 996 So. 2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Finding 
that the state presented evidence that the defendant was irl the home without permission 
and that he entered to "party", the court found that the state presented no evidence that 
the defendant, when he entered the home, had the intent tb drink beer or smoke 
marijuana. Id. at 920. It cited another Florida case in whi^h a defendant entered a mobile 
home and subsequently wrote with a marker on the wall. \[d. at 919-20, citing R.C. v. 
State, 793 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In that case, the court said that a 
reasonable inference could have been made that the defendant entered without 
permission, but not that he intended to commit a crime when he entered. R.C. v. State, 
793 So. 2d 1078 at 1079. 
The Washington Court of Appeals also found insufficient evidence to convict of a 
burglary where a defendant was found inside an auto shop. State v. Young, 2004 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Officers responded to an alarm of a broken 
window at the auto shop and the defendant was found passed out in a vehicle inside the 
shop. Id. at 1-2. The shop's owner testified that the defendant did not have permission to 
be in the shop and that all the windows were intact when he closed earlier that evening. 
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Id. at 2. The defendant testified at that trial and admitted that he was in the car, but could 
not remember how he got there. Id. at 2-3. The court found insufficient evidence for a 
burglary because the state only presented evidence that he entered or remained, not that 
he had the intent to commit a crime. Id. at 8-9. 
This court has held that the intent must be established by factors other than the 
entering or remaining unlawfully. 
Entering or remaining unlawfully is insufficient, by itself, to support a charge of 
burglary. See State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113,117 (Utah 1986). In addition to entering 
or remaining unlawfully, the intent to commit a felony, theft,.. . assault, or 
lewdness, or sexual battery therein must be proved, or circumstances shown from 
which the intent may reasonably be inferred. 
State v. Alexander, 2009 UT App 188, J 11, 214 P.3d 889 (quoting Peck v. Dunn, 51A 
P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1978)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The above-cited cases stand for two general propositions. First, in order to prove 
the intent to commit a burglary, the state must present evidence beyond the mere 
commission of a crime on the premises. Second, the state must also present evidence of 
an intent to commit a crime beyond the defendant entering or remaining unlawfully. 
There must be circumstances which show the intent existed before the defendant entered 
or before the defendant remained unlawfully. Although the state did present evidence 
supporting the commission of a crime on the premises and that the defendant may have 
remained unlawfully, those two factors, by themselves, are insufficient to show the intent 
to commit a burglary. 
30 
C. The Insufficiency Was So Obvious and Fundamental that the Trial Court 
Erred in Submitting the Case to the Jury 
According to Rule 12 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the 
evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, 
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 (p) (2009). The court has the discretion to dismiss the charge, but has 
an obligation to do so when the defendant makes a motioh. See Utah R. Crim. P. 23 
(2009) ("At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, j:he court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted 
do not constitute a public offense .. ."). See also, Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) ("The court may, 
upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a party."). 
Despite the non-mandatory nature of the language in the rules, Utah law still 
requires the court to affirmatively dismiss a case for a failure to meet the elements of the 
offense. "When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a 
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-3 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the Holgate opinion. "Under this 
provision, the trial court 'shall' grant relief when the evidence is insufficient, even if a 
defendant fails to properly raise the issue, but only when the evidentiary defect is 
'apparent' to the trial court." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 15,10 P.3d 346. Construing 
this provision, the court gave some guidance to when an error would be apparent: 
While it is difficult for the court on appeal to dictate when an evidentiary defect 
was apparent to the trial court, there is a certain point at which an evidentiary 
insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental that it would be plain error for the 
trial court not to discharge the defendant. An example is the case in which the 
State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a criminal charge. 
The plain error exception would serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such a case. 
Id. at 5 17 (emphasis added). 
Defendant contends that the arguments he has already made justify this 
conclusion. The state presented no evidence at the trial from which a jury could infer that 
Mr. Rios developed the intent to commit a burglary before he was struck by Ms. 
VanDyke. The trial court should have been aware of this issue because it was 
fundamental: it revolved around the lack of presentation of any evidence to a key element 
of the offense—the defendant's intent after the unauthorized entry.. 
II. THE COMMON LAW AND UTAH LAW BOTH REQUIRE A 
SURREPTITIOUS ELEMENT TO BE PART OF THE "REMAINING 
UNLAWFULLY" COMPONENT OF BURGLARY 
In Utah, a burglary may be committed if a person "remains unlawfully" on the 
premises of another with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault therein. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 76-6-202 (1) (2009). The "remains unlawfully" language should be narrowly 
construed so that it only applies to situations in which the person surreptitiously 
manifests an intent to commit the crime after lawful entry. 
A, The Common Law Supports a Surreptitious Element to Burglary 
At common law, burglary consisted of "the breaking and entering of a dwelling of 
another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony." Deadly Force to Arrest; 
Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 361, 365, n. 34. 
Sir William Blackstone argued that burglary "has always been looked upon as a 
very heinous offence: not only because of the abundant terror that it naturally carries 
with it, but also as it is & forcible invasion of that right of habitation, which every 
individual might acquire even in a state of nature." Quoted in Theodore E. Lauer, 
Wyoming Division: Article: Burglary in Wyoming, 32 L$nd & Water L. Rev. 721,723 
(1997) (emphasis added). Andrew Horn in his, The Mirror of Justices (ca. 1320), defined 
burglary as an offense "committed not only by breaking a house but on those who are in 
their own houses with the intention of reposing therein ir\ peace. The aforesaid assault 
must be made with intent to kill, rob or beat those within the house." Id. at 725, quoting 
Andrew Horn, The Mirror of Justices 28 (Selden Society ed., vol. 7, 1893) (emphasis 
added). In the 16th century, William Lambarde defined thp elements of burglary, most of 
which still exist today: "If any person have by night broken any house, tower, walles, or 
gates, and hath entred in with intent to do any robberie, rr^urder, or other felonious act 
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there." Id. at 726. Sir Edmund Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England written in 1641, 
had formulated the common law definition: UA BURGLAR (or the person that 
committeth burglary) is by the common law a felon, that in the night breaketh and entreth 
in to a mansion house of another, of intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit 
some other felony within the same, whether his felonious intent be executed or not." Id. 
Yet the common law also dealt with the situation in which a person gained entry 
into a home and subsequently committed an offense. It required the person to "break 
out." M a t 727-28. 
In 1962, the Model Penal Code's drafters addressed the issue of burglary, 
particularly since a variety of burglary statutes existed among the states. Id. at 732. They 
subsequently defined burglary. 
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or 
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime 
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is 
licensed or privileged to enter. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for 
burglary that the building or structure was abandoned. 
Id. quoting Model Penal Code § 221.1(1). 
The commentators to the code sought to narrow it to situations in which someone 
invades "the premises under circumstances especially likely to terrorize occupants." 
Model Penal Code § 221.1, cmt. 2 at 67. For states that had adopted a concept of 
burglary including the "remaining in" language, the commentators urged that it be limited 
to suspects who surreptitiously remain after consensual entry. 
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There is a difficulty with the ["remains unlawfully"] language, however, that 
should lead to its rejection. As the Brown Commission pointed out, it literally 
would include "a visitor to one's home . . . who becomes involved in an argument 
with his host, threatens to punch him in the nose, and is asked to leave; if he does 
not leave, but continues his threatening argument, he would . . . be guilty of 
burglary." For this reason, the Final Report of the Brown Commission included in 
the burglary offense one who entered or "surreptitiously" remained without license 
or privilege. 
Id. cmt. 3(a) at 67-71, as quoted in Delgado v. Florida, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000). 
Other commentators agree with this limiting language. 
This common statutory expansion in the definition of burglary makes great sense. 
A lawful entry does not foreclose the kind of intrusion burglary is designed to 
reach, as illustrated by the case of a bank customer who hides in the bank until it 
closes and then takes the bank's money. Moreover, this expansion forecloses any 
argument by a defendant found in premises then closed that he had entered earlier 
\yhen they were open. But for this expansion not also to cover certain other 
situations in which the unlawful remaining ought not be treated as burglary, it is 
best to limit the remaining-within alternative to where that conduct is done 
surreptitiously. 
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 8.13(b) at 468 
(1986) (citations omitted). 
The Florida Supreme Court had to deal with this e^ cact situation in Delgado v. 
Florida, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000). In that case, police found two bodies in a home. Id. 
at 234. There were signs of a struggle. Id. The defendant's blood was found on the scene, 
including the handgun determined to have filed the fatal khots. Id. His palm print was 
found on the telephone and the last call made was to a fri|end of the defendant's. Id. He 
was subsequently charged and convicted of murder and ^rmed burglary. Id. at 235. 
Because there was no sign of forced entry, the state opin0d that Delgado had 
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consensually entered the home and that the consent was subsequently withdrawn. Id. at 
236. The court addressed the "remaining in" language in the statute. 
The court, in addition to citing the Model Penal Code commentary, looked to New 
York state, which also has the "remaining in" language. Id. at 237. The New York court 
dealt with a case in which a person consensually entered a home and subsequently pulled 
a knife on an occupant. Id. The state argued that the consent was automatically revoked 
when the knife was pulled. The court disagreed: 
[The State's] reasoning impermissibly broadens the scope of liability for burglary, 
making a burglar of anyone who commits a crime on someone else's premises. It 
erroneously merges two separate and independent elements that must coexist to 
establish burglary: First, the trespassory element of entry or remaining without 
license or privilege; second, intent to commit a crime. An intrusion without license 
or privilege (unlawful entry) is the distinguishing element, the essence of burglary. 
It must be established separately and distinctly from the intention to commit a 
crime. The mere fact that a crime was committed or was intended is an insufficient 
basis for finding that the entry or remaining was without privilege or authority. 
Id. quoting People v. Hutchinson, All N.Y.S.2d 965,967 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aff d 121 
A.D.2d 849, 503 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div. 1986), appeal denied, 498 N.E.2d 156 (N.Y. 
1986). 
Additionally, the New York courts addressed the "remaining in" language of the 
statute, holding that "the Legislature was plainly addressing a different factual situation-
not one of unlawful entry but of unauthorized remaining in a building after lawful entry 
(as a shoplifter who remains on the store premises after closing)." Id. quoting People v. 
Gaines, 546 N.E.2d 913,915 (N.Y. 1989). 
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The court had grave concerns about construing the "remaining in" language to 
imply that consent would be revoked once a person commits a crime on the property. Id. 
at 238-39. 
1 A] number of crimes that would normally not qualify as felonies would suddenly 
be elevated to burglary. In other words, any crime, including misdemeanors, 
committed on another person's premises would become a burglary if the owner of 
the premises becomes aware that the suspect is committing the crime. Obviously, 
this leads to an absurd result. For example, if a person hosts a party and catches an 
invitee smoking marijuana on the premises, the invitee is not only guilty of a 
misdemeanor marijuana charge but also of burglary, a second-degree felony. The 
same can be said of the invitee who writes a bad check for pizza in front of an 
aware host. The other extreme is also true. An invitee who commits second-degree 
murder on another person's premises and in the presence of an aware host could be 
charged with first-degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being 
burglary. The possibility exists that many homicides could be elevated to first-
degree murder, merely because the killing was committed indoors. 
Id. at 239. The court cited a dissenting opinion in Davis v. State, 131 So. 2d 480,484-86 
(Ala. 1999) as persuasive for its decision in which Justice Almon expressed grave 
concerns about "bootstrap!ing]" nearly every crime that Occurs indoors into a burglary 
and potentially any murder which occurs indoors into a capital murder because of the 
extra offense of burglary. Id. at n. 3. 
The court held that the most consistent interpretation of Florida's burglary statute 
was to hold 
that the "remaining in" language applies only in situations where the remaining in 
was done surreptitiously. This interpretation is consistent with the original 
intention of the burglary statute. In the context of an occupied dwelling, burglary 
was not intended to cover the situation where an invited guest turns criminal or 
violent. Rather, burglary was intended to criminalize the conduct of a suspect who 
terrorizes, shocks, or surprises the unknowing occupant. Many other states that 
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have the "remaining in" language in their burglary statutes have included the word 
surreptitiously or similar language in the statute. 
Id. at 240 citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 401 (West 1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C18-2 (West 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-22-02(1) (1997); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 
1201 (1998). See also S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-310 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. § 30.02 (West 1994); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-90 (Michie Supp. 1999). 
The most rational justification under the common law for the "remaining in" 
language occurs when a person lawfully enters a building and secretes himself, hiding 
and waiting until after hours, then subsequently exits and commits a larceny or felony. 
See, e.g., Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558,560 (Wyo. 1989) (defendant was at a bar and 
pretended to go to the restroom and hid in a crawl space until after hours, when he tried 
to break into the bar's safe). Several different applications of the "remains in" language 
could clearly be used, all of which have the surreptitious element and fit a more 
traditional definition of burglary: 
1. An employee who remains after hours (if he does not have permission to be 
there) intending to commit a theft. 
2. A person who is authorized to be in the building for a particular purpose but 
remains after to commit a felony or theft. For example, a repairman who stays 
after the repairs to commit a theft or a maid who, after changing the sheets and 
towels, remains to commit a theft. 
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3. Another situation would be for a person who ha$ a lawful right to be in a place, 
but manifests the intent to commit a crime once there. For example, a person 
walks into a store intending to shop, but sees valuable property that they want 
to steal. If the person merely walks out of the stdre with the property, he has 
committed a theft and not a burglary because thp "remains unlawfully" element 
has not been met. See State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2 I^ 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998). But 
if the person secretes himself and waits for the employees to leave, then steals 
the property, then he has committed a burglary. The clearer case would be if 
the person was asked to leave by the store and subsequently secreted himself 
and stole the property. 
See Theodore E. Lauer, Wyoming Divison: Article: Burglary in Wyoming, 32 Land & 
Water L. Rev. 721,753 (1997). 
There is clear common-law precedent that burglary was intended for situations in 
which a person unlawfully enters a property with the intejit to terrorize the occupants. In 
the case of remaining unlawfully on the property, the common law supports the 
suggestion that there needs to be an element of surreptitidusness for the offense to 
become a burglary. 
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B, Utah Law Supports the Requirement of a Surreptitious Element to the 
"Remains Unlawfully" Element of Burglary 
The first codified burglary statute occurred in 1851, soon after the Mormon 
pioneers arrived in the Salt Lake Valley. According to that statute, "if any person or 
persons shall unlawfully break into, or enter the yard or dwelling of any person, or into 
their enclosure, or wagon, boat vessel or tent, with a criminal intent of any kind; they 
shall be fined or imprisoned, or both at the discretion of the court." The State ofDeseret -
Appendix: Constitution and Ordinances (1849-1851) § 13, p. 215. In 1855, the 
Legislature significantly broadened the definition of burglary to include something 
similar to the modern "remains unlawfully" element. "If any person break and enter any 
dwelling house in the night time, with intent to commit the crime of murder, rape, 
robbery, larceny or any other felony; or after having entered with such intent, break any 
such dwelling house in the night time, any person being then lawfully therein, such 
offender shall be punished ..." Acts, Resolutions and Memorials, Passed at the Several 
Annual Sessions of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, 1855, § 48, p. 189-
90 (1855). The legislature also allowed for burglary in the day, if the person, with intent 
to commit a felony, breaks and enters (or at night breaks by itself) a house, office, shop, 
store, warehouse, boat, vessel or any building where goods are kept for sale. Id, § 51, p. 
190. The Utah Legislature in 1876 authorized a compilation of the various statutes then in 
effect. Under that enactment, Utah defined burglary as "every person who, in the night 
time, forcibly breaks and enters, or without force enters through any open door, window 
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or other aperture, an house, room, apartment, tenement, or any tent, vessel, water craft, or 
railroad car, with the intent to commit larceny or any other felony is guilty of burglary." 
The Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, Containing All the General Statutes Now In 
Force, 1876, Title XII, Chapter II, § 256, p. 620 (1876). The statute also created a second 
class of burglary, called housebreaking. "Every person who, in the day time, enters any 
dwelling house, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, other building, 
vessel, or railroad car, with intent to steal or to commit any felony whatever therein, is 
guilty of housebreaking." Id. § 258, p. 620-21 (1876). See also, State v. Syddall, 433 P.2d 
10,12-13 (Utah 1967) (Ellett, J. concurring) (Justice Elletjt gives a nice summary of the 
history behind Utah's burglary statute). 
In 1886, the Supreme Court had to determine whether sufficient evidence for a 
burglary conviction existed. People of the Utah Territory v. Morton, 11 P. 512 (Utah 
1886). In that case, the defendants were at a store at night, after the store had been closed. 
Id. at 513. One defendant was arrested near the safe and ^ steel bit or drill was found on 
the floor by him. Id. The court found it "irresistible" to conclude that the defendants had 
any other purpose than to steal under the circumstances, 0ven though there was some 
evidence the defendants may have had permission to enter. Id. 
In 1902, the Supreme Court of Utah dismissed a c&se for insufficient evidence 
when the state failed to show evidence that the burglary occurred at night. State v. Miller, 
67 P. 790 (Utah 1902). In that case, the store owner testified that he locked the store at 
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9:30 pm and found it burglarized the next morning at 6:30 am. Id. at 790. The court held 
that it was essential to prove a burglary that the state show the acts occurred after 
sundown or before sunrise. Id. 
In 1905, the legislature amended the statutes to create first and second degree 
burglary. State v. Hows, et al, 87 P. 163 (Utah 1906). When the legislature amended the 
statute, it added the word "other" to burglary: "the intent to commit larceny or any other 
felony." Id. at 163. The issue in Hows surrounded whether the state had to prove the 
defendant's intent was to commit grand larceny. The court held that "any other felony" 
could encompass crimes other than larceny, including petit and grand larceny. Id. at 163-
64. The court then discussed their perception of what constituted a burglary: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that practically all offenses against the law of 
burglary are committed with intent to steal, and, in nearly all cases, except when 
the defendant is caught with the goods, the extent of the larceny which he intended 
to commit cannot be proved. 
Id. at 164. 
In 1929, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a burglary conviction because it felt 
the trial court failed to adequately present the defendant's theory of defense for a 
burglary. State v. Evans, 279 P. 950 (Utah 1929). In that case, the defendant asserted that 
he thought he had a right to enter the property and take some illegal liquor. Id. at 952. 
The court held that the trial court had failed to properly instruct the jury that if the 
defendant had a subjective belief that he had a right to the property, then he would not be 
guilty of burglary. Id. at 952-53. See also State v. Crawford, 201 P. 1030 (Utah 1921) 
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(finding insufficient evidence to convict for burglary wheile the defendant was found in 
possession of stolen items but no evidence was presented linking him to the break in). 
The Utah Supreme Court has commented on Utah's common law tradition 
regarding burglary, stating that "[a]t common law, the societal interests protected from 
burglary were the sanctity and security of occupancy and tt^ e dwelling place." State v. Pitts, 
728 P.2d 113,115 (Utah 1986). The court in that case held that theft was necessarily 
included in the modern definition of burglary because we no longer strictly relied on the 
common law. Id. at 115-16. 
The Supreme Court of Utah dealt with a burglary case in which the defendant 
claimed the evidence did not support a conviction based qn intent. State v. Johnson, 111 
P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989). In Johnson, the court found sufficient evidence because the "door 
was not wide open, but only ajar, as if to conceal the fact ^hat someone was inside." Id. at 
1073. The defendant was discovered, not by the door, but! by a bedroom. Id. The 
defendant stated upon discovery that he did not intend to $teal anything. Id. A jewelry 
box had been disturbed. Id. This evidence, the court said, gave a sufficient basis from 
which the jury could infer intent. Id. 
The defendant contends that Utah law stands for a few general propositions. First, 
the law clearly requires some sort of "breaking." The early law also required a breaking 
even if the person had lawfully entered—they had to "br0ak out." The early courts were 
adamant that a breaking had to happen and that it had to happen at night, or in day, so 
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long as this breaking occurred. The significance of this early idea is that burglary has 
always revolved around a proposition that one gets into property they are not supposed to 
be getting into, whether a locked safe or a home. As the Pitts court stated, the interest was 
in the sanctity and security of one's property—a privacy and peace interest. See Pitts, 728 
P.2d at 115. To this end, the state has to prove intent to commit a felony, assault or theft, 
thought it almost always has to involve an intent to steal or to terrorize the occupants. See 
State v. Hows, 87 P. 163, 164 (Utah 1906). The second principle is that some effort of 
concealing has always been a part of burglary. The nighttime requirement clearly reflects 
this intent. But even after the nighttime element was no longer part of the statute, the 
courts have rejected convictions where there is an absence of concealing or if the person 
had lawfully entered. See e.g., Evans, 279 P. at 952-53; Johnson, 111 P.2d at 1073. 
Aggravated burglary, the Utah Supreme Court has said, "always requires proof 
that the defendant entered or remained in a building." State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 
(Utah 1995). But what is required specifically to prove that a defendant "remained in" the 
building unlawfully? The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue twice. 
The first case was in 1985 and involved a defendant who went into a home with 
three associates, one of whom pulled a gun on the inhabitants. State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 
874, 875-76 (Utah 1985). The defendant argued that the unlawful entry did not occur, 
since they were invited onto the premises. Id. at 876. The court cited a Kansas court's 
interpretation of similar language, stating, "remaining within refers to the situation where 
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defendant's initial entry is authorized, but at some later time that person's presence 
becomes unauthorized." Id. (emphasis added). The court fpund that the entry was likely 
fraudulently obtained because the defendant, although he obtained consent to enter, did 
not engage in the stated conduct once he was inside the h0me. Id. 
In the second case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the "remains unlawfully" 
provision applies when the initial entry was lawful. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 
876 (Utah 1985). The Supreme Court was also asked to determine whether the "remains 
unlawfully" provision applied only to situations in which the initial entry was lawful. 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). The Supreme Court declined to limit the 
"remains unlawfully" language to lawful entries. Id. at 12^9. The Court also commented 
on the requirements for committing the crime while remaining: 
Rudolph further argues that applying the "remaining unlawfully" provision to all 
situations, regardless of the lawfulness of the entry, will lead to a slippery slope, 
making all crimes committed inside a building a burglary. The flaw in this 
argument, however, is that even under our interpretation, the actor must commit or 
form the intent to commit another crime at the tim$ he enters or while he remains 
unlawfully in the building. In other words, if the actor commits a crime while 
lawfully inside a building, there is no burglary. Thus, contrary to Rudolph's 
argument, not all crimes committed in buildings will constitute burglary under our 
construction of the "remaining unlawfully" provision of the burglary statute. 
Id. 
These cases are significant. According to the Supreme Court, a person cannot 
commit burglary if he is legitimately on the property—evfen if he commits a crime there. 
If he has a right to be on the property, he must do something more than commit a crime in 
order to remain unlawfully. The court says that his presence must become unauthorized. 
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Bradley, 752 P.2d at 876. The difficulty arises in determining what constitutes 
"unauthorized" presence. 
The Supreme Court clearly believed that something more needed to happen—and 
they held that the person's presence needs to first become unauthorized and then he needs 
to remain unlawfully on the premises. Third, he needs to form the intent to commit the 
felony, theft or assault. The law clearly contemplates the classic situation: a person 
secretes himself and goes into a place he has no right to be, taking property. He has now 
done something affirmative to make his presence unauthorized and he remained 
unlawfully on the premises. 
A person's mere asking of another to leave cannot be construed to make the 
subsequent criminal act a burglary. To do so would be to transform one crime into a 
greater crime because of the conduct of the victim (not the conduct of the defendant) — 
such a result in inconsistent with the law. Suppose Ms. VanDyke did not ask Mr. Rios to 
leave her house and never pushed him out, but he assaulted her nonetheless. He would be 
guilty of an assault and nothing more. Yet once she asks him to leave, and he commits an 
offense, she has converted the crime into a burglary. 
It might be helpful to consider Mr. Rios's case to see the potential inconsistencies. 
If his crime were committed in a car—if Ms. VanDyke asked him to leave and he 
assaulted her, he would be guilty of an assault but no more—even though she asked him 
to leave. If they were in Ms. VanDyke's yard (clearly her private property) and he 
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remained after she asked him to leave and he assaulted her, then he would be guilty of an 
assault and likely a trespass, but not a burglary. Yet if sorriehow the event is transferred to 
a building, then any sort of criminal offense that occurs in la building after having been 
asked to leave could be bootstrapped to a burglary. 
Mr. Rios's facts fit squarely within the definition of trespass—once Ms. VanDyke 
asked him to leave, he had an obligation to comply—and when he didn't, he committed a 
trespass, but not a burglary. 
Burglary clearly contemplates more than just the commission of an offense in a 
place where one has a lawful right to be. Otherwise, any drime committed in a building 
would be a burglary. And, the "remains unlawfully" component of burglary clearly 
requires something beyond committing an offense once a person has asked you to leave 
because then crimes committed in people's yards or cars could also be burglaries so long 
as the person asked the other to leave. 
Defendant submits that in order to remain unlawfully, the burglary statute 
implicitly implies that he do all of the three common elements of burglary. First, he 
"breaks"—in the sense that he does something to violate the sanctity and security of 
one's property. The classic example would be a traditional burglary in which one sneaks 
through the window. In the case of remaining, he must st^y on the property once he no 
longer has permission to be there. But this shouldn't end the inquiry. Once a person does 
not have permission to be somewhere that he previously had permission to be, he must 
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conceal himself or do something to hide his presence so that he may commit the crime. 
This reading of burglary clearly differentiates it from trespass and other offenses and 
would result in a more consistent application of the law. Again, this view is supported by 
the drafters of the Model Penal Code, who themselves discouraged the use of the 
"remains unlawfully" language, but if it were used believed that it needed to be read with 
a surreptitious element. Model Penal Code § 221.1, cmt. 2 at 67. Third, once he 
unlawfully remains and secretes himself, he must then form the intent to commit an 
assault, felony or theft therein. 
Defendant submits that under this reading of the burglary statute, he could not 
have committed a burglary because the state presented no evidence that he concealed 
himself or remained on the property surreptitiously when he was no longer authorized to 
be there. As such, this court should reverse his conviction for aggravated burglary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rios asks this court to find that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him of burglary because the state failed to present evidence that Mr. 
Rios manifested an intent to commit a felony, theft or assault after he remained on the 
premises. Additionally, the burglary statute requires an element of surreptitiousness 
which was not present in this case and as such, his conviction should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U day of &&&**&-} . 2010. 
JEL P. NEWTON 
attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A: The State of Deseret - Appendix: Constitution and Ordinances (1849-1851) § 13 
B: Acts Resolutions and Memorials Passed by the First Annual and Special Sessions of 
the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, 1855, § 48 (1855) 
C: The Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, Containing All the General Statutes 
Now In Force, 1876, Title XII, Chapter II, § 256, p. 620 (1|876) 
D: State v. Young, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 375 (Wash. dt. App. 2004) 
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in the lawful defence, of their own life, or limb, or family, or their 
liberty, or his or their property, or in the defence of any public 
property, shall unavoidably take the life or lives of any person 
or persons, on proof of the same before the court: he, she, or they, 
shall be discharged from further prosecution. 
Sec* 10. Be it further ordained, that when any person shall 
be found guilty of murder, under any of the pifeceding sections 
of this ordinance, and sentenced to die, he, she or they shall suffer 
death, by being shot, hung or beheaded* 
Sec* 11. Be it further ordained, that, when any person or 
persons shall be found guilty of murder, and sentenced to diet as 
the penalty of that offence, by any court in this State having 
jurisdiction! the execution of the sentence shall be deferred, until 
a transcript of the proceedings and decision of said court, shall 
be furnished the executive of the State, and upon the acknowledg-
ment of the receipt of the same to the clerk of the court having 
framed the judgment, and the acknowledgment of the same shall 
not be attended with a reprieve, commutation, or pardon; then, and 
in that case, the culprit shall suffer death, as the court may have 
directed. 
Sec. 12. Be it further ordained, that if anv person or persons 
shall, with criminal intent set fire to, or cause the same to be done, 
to any budding of any description, or to any fence, rick of grain, 
or hay, wagon, boat, vessel, raft, bridge or any description of 
property whatever, they shall be deemed guilty of a high misde-
meanor, and upon conviction thereof, he, she, or they, shall be 
fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court,- and, if 
any person or persons shall set fire to any prairie or kanyon of 
timber, they shall, on conviction thereof, be guilty of a high tms<* 
demeanor, and shall be adfudged to pay all damages accruing 
thereby, and be fined or imprisoned, or hoth, at the discretion of 
the court. 
Sec* 13* Be it further ordained, that if any person or persons 
shall unlawfully break into, or enter the yard or dwelling of any 
person, or into their enclosure, or wagon, boat, vessel, or tent, 
with a criminal intent of anv kind; they shall be fined or imprisoned, 
or both, at the discretion of the court. 
Sec, M. Be it further ordained, that if any person shall swear 
falsely, with evil design, pertaining to any case in issue before any 
court, on conviction thereof, they shall be deemed guilty of per-
jury; and he or she shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, as the 
court may direct; and if any person or persons shall hire, or cause 
by any means whatsoever, any person to swear falsely in any case 
in issue before any court; they shall, on conviction thereof, be 
deemed guilty of pequry* and shall suffer the same penalty. 
Sec. 15, Be it further ordained, that if any person or persons 
shall commit a forgery, by making or altering any instrument of 
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fully and maliciously set fire to any other building, boat 
or vessel owned by himself, or another, by which means 
such inhabited building, boat or vessel is burnt; if such 
offence is perpetrated in the night time, or so caused to 
be burnt in the night time, such offender shall be
 P # M j t f , 
punished by imprisonment for life, or any term of 
years; or if the crime shall have been committed in 
the day time, such offender shall be punished by impris-
onment not exceeding thirty years. 
SEC. 43. If any person wilfully and maliciously so 
barn any uninhabited dwelling house, boat or vessel, 0tb*r *•"»'••• 
belonging to another; or any court house, or other pub-
lic building; if in the night time, be shall be punished eimly-
by imprisonment not exceeding twenty-five year&; or if 
in the day time, not more than twenty years, 
SEC 44. If anv person wilfully and maliciously burn. _ . . 
either m the night or day time, any warehouse, store, burning, 
manufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, office, out-house, 
or any building whatsoever of another, other than is 
mentioned in the preceding sections: or any bridge, 
lock, dam, or flue, he shall be punished by imprison- peBaur. 
ment not exceeding fifteen years, and fined not exceed-
ing one thousand dollars. 
SEC. 45. If any person set fire to any building, boat
 MU)uplto 
or vessel, mentioned in the preceding sections, or to bum. 
any material, with intent to cause any such building to 
be burnt, he shall be punished by imprisonment not ex- p»«"»&mmt. 
eeeding ten years, or fined not more than five hundred 
dollars. 
SEC. 46. If any person wilfully and maliciously 
bum, or otherwise destroy or injure any pile or parcel B*ming no** 
of wood, boards, timber, or other lumber; or any fence,, probity, 
bars or gate; or any stack of grain; hay, or other vege-
table product severed from the soil, and not started; or 
any standing trees, grain, grass, or other standing pro-
duct of the soil of another, he shall be punished by 
imprisonment not more than five years, or by fine not *»«*,. 
more than five hundred dollars; or both fine and impri-
sonment, at the discretion of the court 
SEC. 47. The preceding sections under this title „ 
severally extend to a married woman, who comtoite S S S S -
either of the offences therein described, though the pro- misa-
perty burnt or set fire to may belong wholly or in part 
to her husband. 
Sic. 48. If any person break and enter any dwell- _ . ... 
mg house m the night time, with intent to commit the wteat to **. 
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crime of murder, rape, robbery, larceny* or any otln»r 
felony; or after having entereld with such intend break 
any such dwelling house in the night time, any person 
being then lawfully therein, sluch oliender shall be pun-
ished according to the aggravation of the offence, as 
provided m the following two sections. 
SEC. 40. If such offender,! at the time of committing 
tmSSiuUaM s u c ^ burglary, Ls armed with a dangerous weapon, or 
«i<i»». so arm htiast-If after having filtered such dwelling house, 
or actually assault any person being lawfully therein; 
or have any confederates present aidingan<l abetting in 
Frailty, such burglary, lie shall be punished by imprisonment 
for life, or an? term of vearsL 
SEC, 50. If such offender commit such burglary 
if bandar? t*# otherwise than \% mentioned in the preceding section, he 
^*™^smu»
 h\vd\\ fa punished by imprisonment not exceeding 
twenty*five years. 
SEC* 51* If any person with intent to commit a 
felony in the day time, break) and enter, or in the Bight 
^ J ^ time enter without breaking any dwelling house, or a; 
any time break and enter any oftire, .shop, store, ware-
house, boat or vessel, or any building in which goods 
are kept for use, sale or deposit, he &hall be punished 
p , by imprisonment not m^re than ten years, or by fine not 
more tlwm i:\e hundred dollar;*, or both flee and im-
prisonment, 
i l l JL?jp V « 
SEC. 52, If any person steal, take, and<earry away 
i vt*nt d^ned of the property of a n u h e r , any money, good$, or chaf-
tehs, any writ, process, or public record, any bond, bank 
note, promissory note, bill of exchange, or other bill, 
order or certificate, or any book of accounts respecting 
money, goods, or other things or any deed, or writing 
containing a conveyance of real estate, or any coutract 
in hrct\ or any receipt, release, or defeasance, or any 
instrument, or writing wherfeby any demand, right, or 
obligation is created, increased, extinguished^ or dimi-
pemfn** niched, he is guilty of larceny, and shall be punished, 
when the value of the property stolen exceeds the sum 
of twenty dollars, by imprisonment not more than ten 
years; and when the value of the property stolen does 
not exceed the sum of twen£|y dollars, by fine not ex-
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lag set on fire shall have been destroyed. It Is sufficient 
{feat fire is applied so as to take enleet upon any part of the 
mte&mm of the bnildfag. 
(208&) SEC. 262. To eoastitate arson It is not necessary 
that a person other than the -accused should hare had own-
ership m the building set on lire. It is suflicleJit, that at 
the time of the burning another person was rightfully in 
possession of, or was actually occupying such buDding, or 
amy part ti*ereo£ 
(2088,) SEC. 253. Arson is dtfided Into two degrees. 
(2084.) SBC. 251. MaKoiously burning in the night 
time aa Inhabited building in which there Is at the time 
some mamas being is arson in the first degree, all other 
kinds of arson are of the second degree. 
{2085.) SEC, 288. Arson is pnaishaMe by imprisonment 
ia the penitentiary as fallows: 
Rrst—Arson ia fte first degree, i » not less than two 
years, nor more than fifteen years. 
Seeoad—Arson la the second degree, for not less than 
one nor more than ten years. 
CHAPTER H 
mrmi*km AJST» HOCSBBBEAKIX«. 
SCCTIOKf. 
3991 Burglary deflned. 
2087. Poniabrntni ot batghuey. 
3888. Hoa«br«*kiDgd#flM«!d. 
Sxcrros. 
» » . Panlshawsat ot homohreaklng. 




($&8&) SJBC. 256. Every person who, ia i&e night time, 
fomMy breaks m& eaters, &r wtt&oattae eaters through 
any open door, window, or other aperture, any bouse, 
room, apartment, or tenement, or any teat, vessel, water 
eraft, or railroad car, with Intent to commit larceny, or any 
felony Is gaflty of burglary. 
(30874 SEC. 257, Burglary is punishable by imprison-
ment In the penitentiary not less than one nor more than 
ten years, 
(2088.) 8 m 258. Every person who, in the day time, 
enters any dwelling bouse, shop, warehouse, store, mill, 
COMPILED LAW* OF UTAH, i l l 
barn, stable, outhouse, other building, vassal, or milrotd 
oar, with intent to steal or to commit _ .ever 
therein, is guilty of housebreaking, 
(3089,) SEC. 259. Housebreaking m punishable by iin~ ^Jg»* t t t 
prisonment in the penitentiary not less fhau six months nor &**«**»* 
more than three years. 
' (2000*) SEC, 260, The phrase " night time," m used ia -KSJW time* 
this chapter! means the period between sunset and sunrise. 
r»TTAT»TEK HI. 
HAVING nm^mim OF I. now mmimmusm AKI* DEADLY 
W KAPOKS. 
9001 Having |K»a#&i»i0zi of any Imtiru* 20f$<> Hftviagt |NM«araloft€^4«»dly we»|>* 
m«»t Willi Intent to eomm!lbiSJP» on wUhlnt«ntt<»<MQMatimitM^ull^  
(2091.) SEO. 201* Every person having upon him a H»V!»* pot-
picklock, exowkey, bit, other instrument or tool* withiSMmwS07 
intent feloniously to break or enter into any boildfcg, is c*f ' to 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(£092.) SBC. 36S. Every person having upon him any nmm iw-
deadly weapon, with Intent to assault another, is guilty of a d«wuy ^ 
misdemeanor. ^ ^ ^ ^ ° " 
CHAPTER IV. 
FOBfifXG AKS> «>UyTJBRF£rriKG. 
Hscrie*. Siecriox,* 
*Wi Forsgje^ y of win*, wfc**»v*f*«#s, *J$$>. Pna^tof or ««^vi»uii i<wg l^ aoi**» 
tftQU^tand**ete<; tit** :«*& 20& Malting, |*wifig, or tillering: ItaU-
not«», bond*, 6 te . : forw.^ - - HH*~ tiattit bill*, *ta. 
owl* and official rettra*, 2100. CfcnatttrfeiUng «*«, bullion, etc, 
$$** MmkimMmtmtk^in tv *!-" " . . . i . i ^ ^ * ^ •*•'—felting; 
$$$» Forgcty of public and ryr^>r... uwuon^u'. 
*«a3& 2. .ng #r $€**»* \i 
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STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SCOT DANIEL YOUNG, Appellant 
No. 51697-3-1 
COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE 
2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 375 
March 15, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [Ml RULES OF THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE WASHINGTON RULES OF COURT. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported at State v. Young, 120 Wn. App. 1047, 2004 Vtesh. App. LEXIS 1359 
(2004) 
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 02-1-02187-0. Date filed: 
12/18/2002. Judge signing: Hon. David F Hulbert. 
DISPOSITION: Judgment and sentence reversed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was convicted in the Superior Cburt of Snohomish County, 
Washington, for second-degree burglary and sentenced accordingly. Defendant appealed. 
tt>; OVERVIEW: Police responded to an alarm triggered at a business due 
discovered inside a parked car near the broken window. At trial, defendant 
breaking a window at the business, did not remember entering the businbss, 
alarm. The prosecution emphasized that defendant did not have any lawful 
remain in the building. On appeal, defendant contended that there was i 
jury's conclusion that he entered the building with the intent to commit a 
the State had to prove every element of the charged offense beyond a 
found that the State relied on the fact that defendant unlawfully entered 
he entered with any intent to commit a crime. The appellate court concluded 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite intent 
OUTCOME: The judgment of the trial court was reversed. 
a broken window. Defendant was 
testified he did not remember 
, and did not remember hearing the 
, legitimate reason to break into or 
nsufficient evidence to support the 
crime. The appellate court noted that 
reasonable doubt. The appellate court 
^nd remained, but failed to prove that 
that the evidence did not justify a 
to commit a crime in the building. 
CORE TERMS: intent to commit, reasonable doubt, inferred, legitimate ifeason, unlawfully, proven, prosecutor, 
f * 9 /8 /10 ^ 9 9 P1M 
remember, steal, degree burglary, guilt, prosecutor argued, defense counsel, alarm, commit a crime, trier of 
fact, equivocal, burglary, commit, infer, evidence to support, broken window, permissive inference, requisite, 
rebuttal, convict, window, parked, asleep, lawful 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Burdens of Proof > Prosecution 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Weight & Sufficiency 
[HN1] The State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the role 
of the reviewing court to determine whether or not it believes the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence acknowledges the truth of the State's 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Property Crimes > Burglary & Criminal Trespass > 
Burglary > Elements 
[HN2] A person commits second-degree burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime against a person or 
property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling, Wash. Rev. 
Code § 9A.52.030. A jury is permitted to infer a fact essential to find guilt from another fact if reason and 
experience support the inference. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Property Crimes > Burglary & Criminal Trespass > 
General Overview 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Scienter > General Intent 
[HN3] See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.040. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Scienter > General Intent 
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General Overview 
[HN4] Intent to commit a crime may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
commission of an act. Although intent may not be inferred from conduct patently equivocal, it may be inferred 
from conduct that plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability. But for the fact finder to draw 
inferences from proven circumstances, the inferences must be rationally related to the proven fact and the 
presumed fact must follow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact. 
COUNSEL: For Appellant(s): Thomas Michael Kummerow, WA Appellate Project, Seattle, WA. 
For Respondent(s): Constance Mary Crawley, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA. 
JUDGES: Authored by C. Kenneth Grosse. Concurring: Anne L Ellington, Susan R. Agid. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM - Although a jury is permitted to infer a fact essential to a finding of guilt from other proven facts, 
there is insufficient evidence here to support the inference or a conclusion that Young entered or remained in 
the building with the intent to commit a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction is reversed. 
FACTS 
At approximately 2 a.m. on October 5, 2002, the alarm triggered at Barci Automotive in Everett. Everett police 
responding to the call discovered a broken window. After Mr. Barci unlocked the door, a K-9 officer, his dog, 
and other officers announced their presence and entered the building. [*2] The dog's actions indicated that 
someone was inside an El Camino parked in the building near the broken window. An officer approached the 
vehicle and saw Scot Young on the seat. Young did not respond to commands to show his hands. Young was 
either ignoring the officers, asleep, or passed out from the consumption qf alcohol. He was arrested at the 
scene and taken to police headquarters. 
Young is a homeless person who worked in an Everett restaurant at times. In the hours between his shift and 
his arrest he had a number of drinks. Young claimed he did not remember what happened after he left the 
second bar until he was booked at the Snohomish County jail. Young wa^ charged with second degree 
burglary. A jury trial followed. 
At trial, Barci testified that he closed his business about 6 p.m. the evenihg before the break-in. He testified that 
all the windows were intact at the time. He gave nobody permission to enter the business after closing. Police 
testified regarding their arrival and what they found at the scene. 
Young testified he did not remember breaking a window at the auto repai^  business, did not remember entering 
the business, and did not remember hearing the alarm. He [*3] admitted pe was discovered in a parked car on 
the premises, either asleep or passed out. 
The jury was instructed regarding the permissive inference of intent in buiralary cases: 
A person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime 
against a person or property therein. This inference is not binding upon you and it is for you to determine what weight, if 
any, such inference is to be given. 
There was no objection to the instruction. 2 
1 Instruction 9, Clerk's Papers at 39. 
2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Dec. 2 and 3, 2002) at 65. 
In closing argument, both the deputy prosecutor and defense counsel embhasized that the trial issue was 
whether the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a crijne. The prosecutor discussed the 
evidence and argued a permissible inference therefrom. The prosecutor Argued: 
He [Young] had no reason to be in there. By the way, you don't have to pr^ve what kind of crime he 
intended [*4] to commit. The theft, vehicle prowl, malicious mischief, any dumber of crimes. Only that he had 
no legitimate reason to be in that building; and he had no legitimate reasob to be in there.3 
3 VRP (Dec. 2 and 3, 2002) at 69. 
Defense counsel argued there was no evidence indicating Young was in the building to commit a crime. He 
argued that the building owner and the police suggested Young was there to steal, and that this was the 
question the jurors had to answer,, whether Young entered the building to steal something. Counsel 
acknowledged the permissive inference, but argued there simply was no evidence to support that Young had 
any intent to commit a crime. He argued that it didn't make any sense for his client to break in to steal, and then 
remain, sleep, or pass out after the alarm went off. Although Young did not recall any of the events, he and 
counsel suggested Young entered the building to get out of the early morning cold and to sleep off his 
drunkenness. 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued the question [*5] before the jury was not whether Young broke in with the 
intent to steal, but whether he had any lawful, legitimate reason to be in the building. The prosecutor argued 
that Young did not have any lawful, legitimate reason to break into or remain in the building. 
After rebuttal, the jury was excused to the jury room. After the jury left, defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor's argument, claiming that the prosecutor incorrectly stated the law by arguing that the State only had 
to prove that Young did not have a legitimate reason for being in the building. Counsel argued the State's 
burden was to prove that Young entered with the intent to commit a crime therein. The trial court asked defense 
counsel what he would suggest the trial court do. Counsel suggested bringing the jury back into court for the 
judge to reread the "to convict" instruction to them. Stating that he did so in an abundance of caution, the trial 
court brought the jury back into court and reread Instruction 8, the "to convict" instruction, without further 
comment. 
The jury found Young guilty of second degree burglary. Young appeals. 
DECISION 
Young argues there is insufficient evidence to support the [*6] jury's conclusion that he entered the building with 
the intent to commit a crime. We agree. 
It is axiomatic that [HN1] the State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 4 It is not the role of the reviewing court to determine whether or not it believes the evidence at trial 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.6 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
acknowledges the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 6 
4 State v. Green, 94 Wn. 2d 216, 220-21, 616 R2d 628 (1980); State v. Tongate, 93 Wn. 2d 751, 753, 613 P.2d 121 (1980). 
5 Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). 
6 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 
[*7] [HN2] A person commits second degree burglary "if, with the intent to commit a crime against a person or 
property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling." 7 A jury is 
permitted to infer a fact essential to find guilt from another fact if reason and experience support the inference. 
Specifically, RCW9A.52.040 provides: 
<; 2/8/10 5:22 PM 
[HN3] In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have 
acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be 
explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without sucp criminal intent 
[HN4] Intent to commit a crime may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
commission of an act 9 Although intent may not be inferred from conduct patently equivocal, it may be inferred 
from conduct that plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability 10 But for the fact finder to draw 
inferences from proven circumstances, the inferences must be rationally related to the proven fact and the 
presumed fact must [*8] follow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact 11 
7 RCW 9A 52 030 (emphasis added) 
8 State v Bencivenga, 137 Wn 2d 703, 707, 974 P2d 832 (1999) (citing State v Jackson, 112 Wn 2d 867, 875, 774 P2d 1211 
(1989) (quoting Tot v United States, 319 U S 463, 467, 63 S Ct 1241, 87 L Ed 15^9 (1943))) 
9 State v Grimes, 92 Wn App 973, 982, 966 P2d 394 (1998) 
10 State v Bergeron, 105 Wn 2d 1, 19-20, 711 P2d 1000 (1985) (citing State v Lewis 69 Wn 2d 120,124, 417 P2d 618 (1966)) 
11 Jackson, 112 Wn 2d at 875-76 (citing State v Jeffries, 105 Wn 2d 398, 442, 717 Ft 2d 722 (1986), and State v Blight, 89 Wn 2d 
38,44, 569 P 2d 1129 (1977)) 
Under the circumstances here, Young's conduct is equivocal The State relies on the fact that Young unlawfully 
entered and remained, but has failed [*9] to prove that he entered with any intent to commit a crime We hold 
that the evidence does not justify a finding beyond a reasonable doubt thai Young had the requisite intent to 
commit a crime in the auto body facility 
Because we find the State did not prove that Young had the requisite intenf to commit a crime, the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct need not be addressed 
The judgment and sentence are reversed 
FOR THE COURT 
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